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Economic Advantage in East-West Trade:
Abandoning Market Fictions in Trade with
Nonmarket Economy Countries
William Mock*
"One law for the lion and the lamb is tyranny. "* *
I. Introduction
Current U.S. regulation of East-West trade! shows the futility of
smashing a square peg into a round hole. It can be done, but not
without considerable effort and a distortion of at least one basic
premise of the exercise.
East-West trade, or trade between the United States and coun-
tries with nonmarket economies (NME's),2 has been regulated under
• Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the encouragement and assistance of Lawrence M. Friedman (JMLS '89), Laura
L. Michaels (JMLS '86), and Mark E. Wojcik (JMLS '86).
•* William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790-93).
I In this Article, "East-West trade" denotes trade between nonmarket economy
countries and market economy countries, particularly the United States. For further dis-
cussion of nonmarket economies, see infra note 2.
2 Nonmarket economies (NME's) can be identified by the characteristics of: (1)
planned resource allocation; (2) administratively established domestic prices; and (3) non-
convertible currency. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: U.S. LAWS AND
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET ECONOMIES COULD BE IMPROVED 2
(1981) (Su Doc. GA 1.13: ID-81-35) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT].
Under these economic systems, profitability and efficiency in a market sense
cannot be directly measured. Enterprises may appear either profitable or un-
profitable merely because their products are priced very high or very low.
Apparent profits are heavily taxed, while apparent losses are underwritten by
the central government with the aim of maximizing social benefits.
Id. Terms which are used synonymously with "nonmarket economy" in U.S. trade law, as
well as in this Article, include "state-controlled economy country," see 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c) (1982); and "Communist country," see id. § 2436(c) (1982). The Omnibus
Trade and Competitive Act of 1988 also defines "nonmarket economy country": "any
foreign country that the administering authority [i.e., the International Trade Administra-
tion of the United States Department of Commerce] determines does not operate on mar-
ket principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do
not reflect the fair value of the merchandise." Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1316(b), 102 Stat.
1107, 1187 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (18)(A));seealso id., 102 Stat. at 1107 (to be
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B)) (establishing specific factors to be considered in mak-
ing the determination).
One commentator in particular makes a strong argument that the entire mar-
ket/nonmarket distinction is a spurious dichotomy in a world where every nation engages
in a wide variety of economic planning, market intervention, and commercial regulation.
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a variety of U.S. trade laws. Most U.S. trade laws have been designed
to apply to trade with market-based economies. The concepts that
underlie these laws are inapposite to East-West trade. Despite this
fact, U.S. trade laws have been applied to trade with NME's, and
have consequently made domestic regulation of East-West trade con-
voluted, intellectually unsatisfying, and unresponsive to the realities
of NME trade.
For the most part, U.S. trade laws are based upon the premise
that free trade is ideal, as long as such trade is fair. The prevailing
scheme of trade law in the United States recognizes the benefits of
free trade, and it is only when market participants take unfair advan-
tage of the trading system that the system of trading should be re-
stricted in some way. The problem with applying this theory to
NME's arises in defining what trade is fair and what trade is foul.
Without such a definition, much of U.S. trade law is inapplicable to
NME trade and therefore some other analytic premise must be
applied.
Currently, two major areas of U.S. law regulate trade in goods
flowing from NME's to the United States: antidumping and market
disruption law. In addition, some have argued that countervailing
duty law should apply to NME trade. But of all of these areas, only
market disruption law was designed with NME's in mind. This Arti-
cle proposes excluding NME's from the scope of the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws and developing an entirely new legal
regime of trade regulation, including a slightly modified market dis-
ruption law. Such a new legal regime would be based upon the con-
cept of taking maximum economic advantage of the inefficiencies of
NME's. While enjoying this advantage, the new regime would have
to preserve the flexibility needed to respond to the special threats
such an economy can present to market-based economies.
First, this Article summarizes the economic theory of compara-
tive advantage, which provides the intellectual basis for any discus-
sion of fair trade. Next, the Article considers antidumping law,
countervailing duty law, and market disruption law in the context of
imports from NME's. Recent changes in trade law brought about by
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 19883 are reviewed
in this context. The purposes of each area of law and the underlying
economic premises of each area are considered. Serious doubts are
raised as to whether antidumping law and countervailing duty law
should be applied in any way to trade with NME's. Market disruption
law, having been designed for such trade, fares somewhat better.
See Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other ".onmarket Economy" Nations, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 100-35 (1987).
3 Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (to be codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter 1988 Trade Act].
[VOL. 14
EAST-WEST TRADE
This Article then considers the question of whether the concept
of "fair trade" has any meaning in trade with NME's. Concluding
that it does not, this Article proposes a different, more rational basis
for ordering such trade relations. That basis is "economic advan-
tage," whereby underpriced imports from NME's are permitted to
enter the United States without special import restrictions or tariffs,
provided certain special circumstances are absent. This Article iden-
tifies some special circumstances that warrant import restrictions in
short-term derogation of the principle of economic advantage. The
Article concludes with a call for further consideration of abandoning
market fictions in trade with NME's.
II. Comparative Advantage
The basic premise for international trade is the economic theory
of comparative advantage. 4 Under that theory, if each nation pro-
duces and exports those products for which it has a comparative ad-
vantage in production, more goods will be produced globally for the
same or less cost than if no nations traded.5 As a consequence, each
nation should export those products for which it has cheaper raw
materials, lower wage rates, better capital and infrastructural compo-
nents, and more efficient production. 6 Similarly, each nation should
import those products for which other nations have these
advantages.
This theory was first formulated by David Ricardo in the early
19th century, 7 who built upon Adam Smith's analysis of absolute ad-
vantage as a basis for international trade.8 Ricardo's example of
comparative advantage in action is still the most widely recited:
England may be so circumscribed that to produce... cloth may
4 For an excellent discussion of the economics of international trade, including the
theory of comparative advantage and its progeny, see D. GREENWAY, TRADE POLICY AND
THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 9-31 (1983).
5 Comparative advantage is commonly understood to mean the "special ability of a
country to provide one product or service relatively more cheaply than other products or
services." THE MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 110 (2d ed. 1973).
[T]he fundamental point [of the theory of comparative advantage is] that the
beneficiality of international trade depends in no way on the absolute levels
of economic efficiency or "stages of economic development" of the trading
partners but only on differences in their relative costs of production in the
absence of trade. . . . [Wihat matters is the differences in the alternative
opportunity costs of commodities in the absence of trade.
8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 85 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
6 The theory of comparative advantage states that "each country should export the
products of its relatively efficient industries. If an industry combines low wages with high
technology, then that industry will be a relatively efficient industry in that country." IN-
TERFACE ONE: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS TO IMPORTS FROM STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMIES AND STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES 208-09 (D. Wallace, G. Spina, R. Rawson, & B. McGill eds. 1980)
(statement of Professor Paul Marer) [hereinafter INTERFACE I].
7 D.RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817).
8 See generally A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
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require the labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to
make ... wine, it might require the labour of 120 men for the same
time.
To produce the wine in Portugal might require the labour of
only 80 men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same
country might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It
would therefore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange
for cloth. This exchange might even take place notwithstanding that
the commodity produced by Portugal could be produced there with
less labour than in England. Though she could make the cloth with
the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country where it
required the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be
advantageous for her rather to employ her capital in the production
of wine, for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than
she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cul-
tivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth.9
Subsequent writers have greatly refined this theory, carrying it
far beyond its initial assumptions of two countries, two commodities,
and simple labor-productivity cost analysis. 10 Of greatest relevance
to this Article are the works of Eli Heckscher, 1 ' Bertil Ohlin,12 and
Paul Samuelson1 3 in shifting the emphasis of attention from produc-
tivity differences to endowment differences. Their line of analysis
established that comparative advantages in endowments of basic
production factors, including labor and capital, 14 drives interna-
tional trade as effectively as comparative advantages in labor produc-
tivity. In particular, each country should and, if market forces
operate freely, will export those goods as to which the country has a
relative abundance of low-priced factor endowments.1 5 Most simply
put, labor-rich countries tend to ship products with a high labor in-
put to labor-scarce countries. Essentially the same statements could
be made with respect to capital-rich, technology-rich, and resource-
rich countries. If trade is permitted to take place on such a basis,
then more goods will be produced and distributed to those desiring
them than if each country were to rely solely upon its own resources
for meeting internal demand. This is the essence of the argument
for global free trade.
Nevertheless, there are some costs associated with such trade.
9 D. RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 82 (Dent ed.
1978).
10 See D. GREENAWAY, supra note 4, at 13ff.
11 See generally Heckscher, The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income, in
EcONOMIsc TIDSKRIFT - (1919), reprinted in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 272 (H. Ellis & L.A. Metzler eds. 1950).
12 See generally B. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1935).
13 See generally Samuelson, International Trade and the Equalization of Factor Prices, LVIII
EcON. J. 163-84 (1948); Samuelson, International Factor Price Equalization Once Again, LIX
ECON. J. 181-97 (1949).
14 This Article uses capital to denote any immobile investment already made in plants,
equipment, and the like, not free-flowing financial capital.
15 D. GREENAWAY, supra note 4, at 14.
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In particular, one assumption of comparative advantage theory is
that labor and capital are mobile enough to flow without cost from
sectors declining because of import displacement into developing
export sectors. Such cost-free mobility is, of course, not reality. In
reality, trade should only occur to the extent that the benefits from
such trade outweigh the adjustment costs associated with the trade.
Such costs are likely to be highest when trade patterns shift rapidly.' 6
Similarly, where the free flow of labor and capital is not possible,
the full benefits of free trade may not be available. Such a situation
arises when an industry has high barriers to entry, whether through
natural scarcity of resources, government monopoly, or economic
disincentives.' 7 Once a firm or nation has established itself as a ma-
jor producer in such an industry, it may be difficult for other firms or
nations to adjust if production falls out of line with the ideals of com-
parative advantage. In the simplest case, a producer that succeeds in
driving out its competition may begin to act as a monopolist, charg-
ing exorbitant prices and dipping below optimal production. 8
Finally, consumption and trade are not the only public goods a
nation must seek to supply. Security is also a basic desideratum, and
trade cannot prosper without peace. 19 Even the increased prosperity
produced by free trade is unwarranted where such trade undermines
national security. Such a situation could arise where an unfriendly
nation became a significant supplier of something essential to na-
tional defense, or where an industry essential to national defense is
threatened with serious damage.20
The theory of comparative advantage is basic to an understand-
ing of arguments for free trade and underlies most U.S. trade laws
dealing with fair trade. As will be shown, this theory has serious
drawbacks in ordering trade with NME's. Further discussion of this
point must, however, await a brief presentation of those U.S. trade
laws.
16 See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text (discussing market disruption law);
infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of economic disruption).
17 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw §§ 9.5, 10.5 (3d. ed. 1986).
18 See id. at chs. 9, 10.
19 See generally R. ROSENCRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE (1986). In this
book, Rosencrance discusses the conflict between the military-political view of territorial
aims and the trading-world view of economic gains. He states that these two views will
continue to co-exist, but are essentially incompatible:
One of the difficulties facing the trading system throughout history is its in-
ability to gain universal adherence so long as important and powerful states
are still primarily devoted to the territorial system. Unchecked gains by terri-
torial nations would lead even to the most conspicuous protagonists of trade
to reconsider their position and, ultimately, to renew their territorial de-
fenses. Thus the territorial system could always nibble away at the fringes of
the trading system and sometimes overturn it entirely as it did during World
War I.
Id. at 18.
20 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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III. Current United States Trade Law
A. Antidumping Law
U.S. law protects domestic industries against foreign parties who
sell goods in the United States for less than "fair value." This pro-
cess of selling in the United States for less than fair value is called
dumping. If the International Trade Administration of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce (ITA) finds that dumping has occurred and
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that the
dumping has caused or threatens to cause material injury to a do-
mestic industry21 then extra duties equal to the level of underselling
are assessed on the goods to remedy the price imbalance. 22
Although an antidumping case can take a long time to bring to a
conclusion, relief is automatic once dumping and injury have been
found.23
For purposes of this Article, it is the ITA's dumping investiga-
tion that is relevant. Dumping is found whenever it is determined
that the product in question sells for less than fair value in the
United States. The ITA compares fair value, or "foreign market
value," 24 to the United States price, and if the former exceeds the
latter, then dumping has occurred. It is the concept of fair value that
creates problems in trade with NME's.
For dumping analysis to apply, even in theory, there must be
some home or third-country market from which to derive fair value.
Efforts to fit this market economy concept of fair value into an analy-
sis of trade with NME's have led to some amazing contortions of
legal analysis. Both the regulations which have been promulgated to
define fair value in the NME context and efforts to apply those regu-
lations reveal the agility of legal minds seeking to accomplish the
impossible. Furthermore, legislative proposals for reform of this
area of law reveal the impossibility of applying dumping concepts to
NME situations at all.
1. Fair Value Under Current Law
For market economy countries, there exists a hierarchy of meth-
ods for calculating fair value. The usual method is to use, with cer-
tain adjustments, the price for which the same or similar goods sell
in the home market.25 If such a figure is unattainable or unreliable, 26
21 The term "material injury" is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, im-
material, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
22 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
23 INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 154 (statement of Harvey M. Applebaum, Esq.).
24 The termsfair value and foreign market value are used synonymously in this Article.
Technically, "fair value" reflects an interim estimate of foreign market value. See 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.1 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., I st Sess. 59 (1979), reprinted in
1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 144, 182.
25 19 C.F.R. § 353.3 (1988).
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the next method is to use the price of the same product, from the
same source, in a third-country market. 27 The third method is to
construct a figure for fair value. This "constructed value" is based
upon a calculation of production costs and profits in the country of
origin. 28
These approaches are analytically consistent. Each method of
calculation upholds the basic premise of antidumping law that it is an
unfair distortion of markets to support low-price sales to the United
States with higher priced sales at home or in some other export mar-
ket. Such price discrimination between markets frustrates adjust-
ment of international trade patterns according to each nation's
comparative economic advantage. 29 Furthermore, each method uses
actual prices or a sum of actual factor prices to compare with the U.S.
price.
There is also a hierarchy of methods for calculating fair value for
imports from NME's. The primary method after enactment of the
1988 Act is to develop a constructed value for the NME goods.30 As
is true with a constructed value analysis involving goods from a mar-
ket economy country, the ITA aims to determine a fair value for the
merchandise, where circumstances prevent the home market price
from being a reliable indicator of value. A major distinction between
NME constructed value and market economy constructed value,
however, is that the process of constructing a value for NME goods
does not generate actual price figures. Instead, hypothetical prices
from surrogate countries are utilized.
In general, the ITA calculates a constructed value by adding to-
gether the cost of all materials and processing necessary to make the
product, packing and containers needed to ship the goods, and sums
for general selling and administrative expenses and profit.3 ' In con-
structing a value for goods from a market economy, the ITA com-
bines production factors and prices from the home country of the
merchandise. In constructing a value for merchandise from a NME,
the process becomes more complicated. First, the ITA determines
the input factors of the merchandise from the actual production pro-
cess in the NME. Next, the ITA identifies a surrogate market econ-
26 For example, if all sales in the home market are made below the cost of produc-
tion. See Toho Titanium Co. v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 1280 (1987); Toho Titanium
Co. v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 1019 (1987); Toho Titanium Co., Ltd. v. United States,
693 F. Supp. 1191 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
27 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.4 to .5 (1988).
28 Id., § 353.6 (1988).
29 See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text (discussing comparative advantage);
infra notes 102-115 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of comparative
advantage to NME trade).
30 See 1988 Trade Act, supra note 3, § 1316(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1186 (1988) (to be
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)).
31 19 C.F.R. § 353.6(a) (1988).
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omy country at "a level of economic development comparable to that
of the nonmarket economy country." 2 The ITA makes this determi-
nation on the basis of a range of economic factors including per cap-
ita gross national product3 3 and infrastructure development.3 4 The
input factors from the NME are then priced out in the market of the
surrogate country. Finally, the ITA makes any necessary adjust-
ments and currency conversions to achieve the final figure for con-
structed value.
Thus, with products from NME's, the ITA determines and val-
ues the factors in different economic systems. Factors of production
are determined in the NME producing the merchandise. Values are
then assigned to those factors based upon the values of such factors
of production in surrogate market economy countries.
If the ITA is unable to make such a constructed value analysis
because the available information is inadequate, then the foreign
market value must be determined by another method. That method
is to use the foreign market value of comparable merchandise pro-
duced by surrogate producers. Those producers must be located in
one or more market economy countries at comparable levels of de-
velopment to the NME including, if appropriate, the United States.3 5
Prior to enactment of the 1988 Act, the hierarchy of methods
was different. The preferred method was to use the price at which
similar merchandise produced by a surrogate producer in a market
economy country was sold in its home market. 36 The second
method was to use the price at which such surrogate producer mer-
chandise was sold to other countries, including the United States.3 7
The final method was to construct a value for the same or similar
merchandise in a surrogate country with a market economy.3 8
These, then, are the methods that have been devised to calculate
fair value when traditional market-based statistics are not available.
Unfortunately, these methods do little to answer the basic objection
that no effort to approximate market realities in NME's produces
meaningful figures.
32 1988 Trade Act, supra note 3, § 1316(a), 102 Stat. at 1186-87 (to be codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)).
33 The ITA "has routinely utilized World Bank figures [for GNP], even though the
compilers of that data have stressed their information is not reliable for such compari-
sons." See Alford, supra note 2, at 91 (citing THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ATLAS 16
(1980)).
34 Id. See also infra text following note 51 (further discussing "comparable
economy").
35 1988 Trade Act, supra note 3, § 1316(a), 102 Stat. at 1186 (to be codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2)).
36 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(a)(1)(i) (1988).
37 Id. § 353.8(a)(1)(ii) (1988).
38 Id. § 353.8(a)(2) (1988).
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2. Objections to Current Law
Severe analytic and practical difficulties arise whenever an-
tidumping law is applied to NME's. First, it is unclear what unfair
trade practice is occurring when NME dumping is found. Second,
practical limitations make it impossible to determine fair value in any
predictable fashion, placing NME producers and U.S. importers of
NME products in positions where they are helpless to adjust their
pricing to avoid violations of the law. Third, the suggested means of
applying antidumping law to NME's appears to do away with the
concept of comparative advantage in such trade.
According to some NME authorities, NME's have no incentive to
dump.3 9 In effect, NME's are merely seeking to obtain hard currency
and have abandoned the traditional mercantile incentives to dump.40
Therefore, NME's generally seek the highest possible revenues for
their exports to market economy countries.4 ' NME producers may
certainly have some traditional market-economy incentives to sell
their products abroad at low prices, such as to dispose of excess in-
ventory. However, it is unclear even in those situations whether the
NME is selling at less than an economically "fair" price, because that
fair price would have to be determined in a market context that
doesn't exist within a NME.
The ITA is forced to seek the cooperation of market economy
producers to act as surrogates for NME producers. Market economy
producers often refuse to cooperate with U.S. antidumping investi-
gations where cooperation would require that they open their books
and plants to investigators seeking to construct a fair value for a
NME product.4 2 In its investigation of alleged dumping of certain
iron construction castings from the People's Republic of China, the
ITA had tremendous difficulties of this kind:
For its final determination, [the ITA] identified eight potential
surrogate countries: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. However, when requested to
complete the questionnaires supplied by [the Department of] Com-
merce each country refused to cooperate except Indonesia, whose
responses were inadequate. 4 3
39 For example, some NME officials contend that NME's would never engage in
dumping due to the practice's impact on international worker solidarity. See Alford, supra
note 2, at 133 n.273.
40 INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 226 (statement of Mr. Meyer Rashish).
41 Speaking of Poland, one former Polish government official stated, "We have no
policy of setting a price lower than the market price." INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 223-24
(statement of Dr. Andrzej T. Werner).
42 In addition, some governments openly discourage their firms from cooperating
with United States antidumping investigations. And some foreign firms simply refuse to
cooperate and others may intentionally distort data for their own economic interests.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 14-15.
43 China Nat'l Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp. v. United States, 674 F.
Supp. 1482, 1483 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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The Indian government, for example, refused to cooperate be-
cause of differences in industrial base, infrastructural facilities, rela-
tive factor endowments, political and economic management, and
different priorities in industrial development. 44 For whatever rea-
sons, India has regularly refused to serve as a surrogate for China, 45
except on one occasion where no comparable product was manufac-
tured in India itself.
46
Even where such cooperation has been forthcoming, the results
have been unsatisfactory. In one case involving potassium fertilizers
from the Soviet Union, a preliminary dumping margin of 187 per-
cent was found by choosing a West German company as the surro-
gate producer. 47 For the final determination, a Canadian company
was used as the surrogate producer, and the dumping margin had
fallen to 1.7 percent.48 This is not a mere ministerial determination
of comparability, leading to a rational calculation of dumping mar-
gin; the surrogate producer issue essentially controlled the entire
outcome of the case.49 In one case involving a surrogate country,
values for Polish golf carts were constructed using Spanish values for
Polish input factors. This produced a peseta "fair value" which was
44 Id. at 1484.
45 Id. at 1485-86. Many investigations in which India has refused cooperation as a
surrogate have resulted in findings of sales at less than fair value. See, e.g., Porcelain-on-
Steel Cooking Ware from the People's Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,419 (1986);
Certain Small Diameter Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from the People's Republic
of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,078 (1986); Steel Wire Nails from the People's Republic of
China, 49 Fed. Reg. 10,247 (1986); Barium Carbonate from the People's Republic of
China, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,913 (1984); Potassium Permanganate from the People's Republic
of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,347 (1983).
46 For the occasion when India did cooperate in a creation of a constructed value for
a product not produced in India, see Chloropicrin from the People's Republic of China, 49
Fed. Reg. 5,982 (1984). Even when a country that is not a producer is requested to act as a
surrogate
there is little, if any, incentive for their producers to provide us with the de-
tailed information we require and to allow us to verify it by examining their
books and records. For example, in 1982 we persuaded Finnish carbon steel
plate producers to serve as our surrogate in investigating plate from
Romania. The Finns provided us information and let us verify it. Then on
February 10, 1984, United States Steel Corporation filed an antidumping pe-
tition on plate from Finland, using the very same information obtained in the
Romanian investigation. You can imagine how dismayed the Finns were with
the results of their cooperation; and how that experience has made it difficult
to find cooperative surrogates in other NME antidumping investigations.
Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1984) (statement of Undersecretary of
Commerce for International Trade Lionel H. Olmer).
47 Potassium Chloride from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 49 Fed. Reg.
35,849 (1984).
48 Potassium Chloride from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 50 Fed. Reg.
4,562, 4,563 (1985). The International Trade Commission found no material injury by
reason of the Soviet imports. See Potassium Chloride from the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, USITC Pub. 1656, Inv. No. 731-TA-187, at 1 (1985). The minute dumping
margin certainly played a part in this determination.
49 See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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then converted into dollars for purposes of comparison with the U.S.
value to determine a dumping margin. 50 Whatever such an exercise
signified, it did not reveal anything about the genuine advantages
Poland may have had in factor endowments. As one observer put it,
surrogacy (and, afortiori, constructed value analysis) produces noth-
ing but a "mythical cost." '5'
Under a constructed value analysis, the comparative advantage
of the NME is rendered irrelevant. The merchandise input values
that, ideally, should reflect the NME's comparative advantage are re-
jected because of an internal failure of market mechanisms. In their
place, the ITA substitutes the input values of comparable merchan-
dise in a surrogate country. Those values will naturally reflect the
surrogate country's own comparative advantage. The fact that the
surrogate country is one "at a comparable level of development"
does not answer this complaint. Two nations at comparable levels of
development could easily have differing values attached to specific
raw materials, particular kinds of labor, and capital. Similarity of
gross domestic product per capita and infrastructural development
does not even begin to suggest comparable input factor values, for
the macroeconomic does not necessarily reflect the microeconomic.
Thus, constructed value analysis pushes NME's to price their prod-
ucts, and find market niches, appropriate to third-country endow-
ment factors and third-country comparative advantage. Further,
whose comparative advantage a NME must be held to is not known
until after marketing has occurred.
3. "Artificial Pricing" and other proposals
In each of the last several Congresses, proposals have been
made to amend the unfair trade laws to acknowledge that the market
economy concepts behind U.S. antidumping laws do not apply to
NME's. 5 2 These efforts, largely associated with Senator John Heinz,
Republican from Pennsylvania, have used a concept which has come
to be known as "artificial pricing." 5 3 Under these artificial pricing
50 Letter from John D. Greenwald, I.T.A. Dept. Assistant Secretary for Import Ad-
ministration, to Catherine Bedell, I.T.C. Chairman (May 9, 1980), reprinted in Electric Golf
Cars from Poland, USITC Pub. 1069, Inv. No. AA1921-147(A), at App. C (1980). This
was a method employed to determine fair value for electric golf cars from Poland that had
previously been determined to have been sold at less than fair value under another
method. The previous method was unavailable due to changes in facts between the initial
determination and the date of the new imports. See id. at A-4. For a fine summary of the
legal contortions undergone by the administering authority in trying to construct a value
for Polish golf carts made in a hypothetical Spanish factory, see Note, Dumping from 'Con-
trolled Economy' Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 777 (1979).
51 INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 219 (statement of Bruce E. Clubb, Esq.)
52 See S. 1966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 30,677-80 (1979); S. 958, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7094-96 (1981); S. 1351, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S.
1868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
53 The artificial pricing theory "presumes that there is no reasonable method to eval-
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proposals, antidumping law or market disruption law,54 or both 55
would be amended to remove any requirement that the ITA investi-
gate either costs or factors of production of goods within the NME.
Under these artificial pricing proposals, a minimum allowable
import price for each NME product would be established. 56 Any
time the import price of a NME product exceeded the minimum al-
lowable import price, an extra duty would be imposed on the im-
port.5 7 The minimum allowable import price would be calculated
according to one of a number of formulae under the proposed legis-
lation.58 What these formulae have in common is that the floor price
for "fairly traded" NME imports would be the price for the same
product from a market economy competitor.
Proponents of an artificial pricing approach seem to acknowl-
edge, as does this Article, that antidumping theory is inapplicable to
NME imports. They argue that use of antidumping law to limit NME
imports lacks the predictability, ease of administration, and essential
competitive fairness needed to promote free trade without exposing
domestic industries to undue and unfair risks from foreign competi-
tion. 59 Current means of applying unfair trade laws to NME trade
are elaborate in procedure and unpredictable in result. Indeed, the
procedures themselves are sometimes cited as examples of unwar-
ranted trade barriers. 60
uate NME actions in order to measure the market economy concepts of "subsidy" or "less
than fair value." Firestone, Artificial Pricing as an Alternative to Countervailing Duties Against
Imports from .onmarket Economies, 8J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 75, 76 (1986) (footnote
omitted).
54 See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text (discussing market disruption law).
55 See S. 1351, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (seeking to amend the antidumping laws);
S. 958, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981) (seeking to amend the market disruption laws); S.
1966, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (seeking to amend both). This series of proposed legis-
lation suggests, at the least, some uncertainty as to the proper application of the theory
behind the antidumping laws to NME trade.
56 Firestone, supra note 53, at 82-84.
57 Id.
58 For example, S. 1966 required resort to any producer or aggregate of producers in
a free-market country, including the United States, supplying more than 5% of apparent
domestic consumption. See S. 1966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § I(b) (1979). S. 958 dropped
the 5% figure in favor of a requirement that the producers chosen produce a sufficient
volume to establish a representative price. See S. 958, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1(a) (1981).
And S. 1351 merely required that the administering authority select the "most suitable"
free market economy producer, including one in the United States. See S. 1351, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(d) (1983).
59 Firestone, supra note 53, at 79-82.
60 Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation: Hearings on S. 1351 Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984) (statement of
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Esq.); INTERFACE Two: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST TRADE 39-40 (D. Wallace & D. Flores eds. 1982) [hereinafter
INTERFACE II] (statement of Prof. Robert D. Hudec); see generally Jackson, Perspectives on the
Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1570 (1984). In 1981, market economy dumping cases cost $50,000 to
$75,000, with NME dumping case costs being dramatically higher. COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
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Nevertheless, these proponents attempt to remedy this problem
by creating an unfair trade law to be applied to NME's without refer-
ence to the concept of fairness. Artificial pricing fails to take into
account any conception of comparative advantage, because it sets a
floor price for imports that is totally unrelated to any production in-
put factors within the source country itself.6' In effect, all low-priced
trade threatens being labelled as "unfair" and countered by in-
creased duties.
B. Countervailing Duty Law
Under U.S. law, a domestic industry may obtain tariff protection
from imports being subsidized in the country of production. 62 Be-
cause such subsidies distort the international allocation of resources,
the law imposes countervailing duties, designed to counter the effect
of the subsidy. 63 Once again, concerns that goods are being intro-
duced too cheaply into the U.S. market have led to the creation of
trade barriers. Essentially, countervailing duties are designed "to
protect American firms from what [Congress] viewed as the unfair
competitive advantage a foreign producer would have in selling in
the American market if that producer's government in effect as-
sumed part of the producer's expenses of selling here.. 64
Proponents of applying countervailing duty law to NME trade
argue, first, that the "only purpose of the countervailing duty law is
to extract the subsidies contained in merchandise entering the com-
merce of the United States in order to protect domestic industry
from their effect." 65 In so doing, they deny that countervailing duty
law has anything to do with comparative advantage or "the diminu-
tion of world wealth." 66
61 Remedy for Artificial Pricing of Articles Produced by Nonmarket Economy Countries: Hearing
on S. 958 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 53 (1982) (statement of John D. Greenwald, Esq.); Soltysinski, Scope Paper: The
Application of US. Antidumping and Other Foreign Trade Competition Laws to the So-Called State-
Controlled Economy Enterprises, in INTERFACE II, supra note 60, at 169, 184-85; Soltysinski,
U.S. Antidumping Laws and State-Controlled Economies, 15J. WORLD TRADE L. 251, 258 (1981).
62 Most NME's would not be entitled to an injury determination in a countervailing
duty investigation because they are not GATT signatories and have not received
equivalent rights under any other provision of U.S. law. For that reason, most NME's
would, if at all, be subject to countervailing duty investigations under section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, which does not provide for an injury investigation. See Tariff Act of
1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). Because this Article concentrates on the nature of
the foreign acts, not the degree of the injury such acts may cause, the distinction is not of
immediate significance.
63 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (countries receiving GATT benefits); id.,
§ 1303 (1982) (countries not receiving GATT benefits).
64 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986);see
also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1978).
65 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 553 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985), vacated in part and revd in part sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801
F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
66 Id.
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In countering this view, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit noted that the purpose of countervailing duty law was "to
offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would
otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments. '67
In a market economy, a subsidy operates to encourage a seller to
export when it would not otherwise be in his interest to do so. This
would, in a free market setting, distort decision making on issues of
resource allocation and production of goods. This kind of "unfair"
competition, the court reasoned, could not arise in the context of
exports from a NME. 68
Second, proponents argue that it is unnecessary to have a mar-
ket-oriented system in order to encourage exports by means of spe-
cial economic preferences. Although normal central control of the
economy would not be countervailable, exceptional economic incen-
tives would accomplish the same export objectives as would a sub-
sidy in a market economy, and hence would be countervailable. 69
Such proponents argue that the difficulty lies not in the theoretical
application of countervailing duty law to NME's, but in measuring
what economic incentives are sufficiently exceptional to warrant
countervailing action. 70
It is true that a major difficulty in this view lies in distinguishing
between "normal" and "extraordinary" economic incentives in a sys-
tem grounded upon an entire system of noneconomic incentives.
The reason for this difficulty lies in the incompatibility of counter-
vailing duty law and NME's. 7 1 In market economies, pervasive infra-
structure benefits (such as government development of roads and
ports) are not countervailable. 72 In a NME, such benefits cover a
massive range of the economy, so that either everything about a
NME product would be subject to countervailing duties, or nothing
would be. Any line between would be arbitrary. If subsidies are der-
ogations from market mechanisms then every aspect of a NME's cen-
tral economic planning would be a subsidy. 73
Third, proponents note that countervailing duty law has been
applied to nonmarket sectors of market economies.74 The Supreme
Court approved of countervailing duties being applied to a state-
67 Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1315 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,
437 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1978)).
68 Id. at 1315.
69 Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 552-54.
70 Id. at 554 (emphasis in original).
71 The court in Georgetown Steel found, in effect, that theoretical, not ministerial, diffi-
culties underlay any attempt to apply countervailing duty law to NME trade.
72 Carlysle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 4 I.T.R.D. 2017 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983).
73 Some NME derogations from market mechanisms could, of course, have negative
effects upon enterprises within the country. These could be viewed as taxes, using the
same logic that views all beneficial derogations as subsidies.
74 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F.Supp. 548, 555 (Ct. Int'l Trade
[VOL. 14
EAST-WEST TRADE
controlled sugar industry in Tsarist Russia, 75 and several administra-
tive decisions applied countervailing duty law to goods from the
heavily state-controlled economy of Nazi Germany.76 By analogy,
proponents argue, there should be no theoretical objection to apply-
ing the same law to nonmarket sectors of NMEs. Indeed, not to do so
would result in absolving nations only when their interference in the
marketplace becomes complete, rather than selective.
Nevertheless, an alleged NME subsidy is a payment that the gov-
ernment is making to itself, and one which would not enable addi-
tional exports to take place because of some new market distortion. 77
By contrast, a subsidy granted to a state-controlled enterprise in a
market economy would produce distortions in the otherwise market-
oriented forces of that economy. Those distortions could be mea-
sured against the background of those normal market forces. 78
Finally, proponents draw an analogy to antidumping law.79 Any
objections to the application of countervailing duty law to NME
trade should apply even more strongly as to antidumping law. As
noted earlier, antidumping law requires calculation of a home mar-
ket value for the merchandise being imported. If there is no home
country market, and no home market value is even theoretically cal-
culable, it would seem that antidumping law is analytically inapplica-
ble to NME products.80 Yet Congress and the ITA found a way to
construct a home market value by reference to surrogate countries.8'
If the theoretical hurdle of applicability has been cleared with respect
to antidumping laws, proponents argue that it should also be cleared
with respect to countervailing duty laws.
1985), vacated in part and rev'd in part sub nor. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801
F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
75 See Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
76 See, e.g., Countervailing Duties-Imports from Germany, T.D. 49,878, 74 Treas.
Dec. 475 (1939); Countervailing Duties on Imports from Germany, T.D. 49,821, 74 Treas.
Dec. 389 (1939), T.D. 49,849, 74 Treas. Dec. 438 (1939), T.D. 49,958, 75 Treas. Dec. 82
(1939), T.D. 49,998, 75 Treas. Dec. 139 (1939); Countervailing duties on ethyline
dibromide from Germany, T.D. 49,719, 74 Treas. Dec. 192 (1938); Countervailing Duties
on Certain German products, T.D. 48,360, 69 Treas. Dec. 1008 (1936), T.D. 48,463, 70
Treas. Dec. 172 (1936), T.D. 48,444, 70 Treas. Dec. 134 (1936); Countervailing Duties-
German products, T.D. 48,479, 70 Treas. Dec. 20 (1936); Countervailing duties on alumi-
num foil and manufactured articles containing aluminum from Germany, T.D. 47,501, 67
Treas. Dec. 187 (1935).
77 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
78 See generally Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of
1930, 13 LAw & POLY INr'L Bus. 681 (1981) (concluding that the escape clause provisions
should be the dominant United States statutory approach to regulating international
trade).
79 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 555 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985), vacated in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801
F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
80 See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (discussing the author's objections to
current law).
81 See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of fair value
under the current law).
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This Article is in full agreement with the foregoing final argu-
ment. The conclusion to be drawn from this argument, however, is
not that countervailing duty law should apply to NME's. Rather, the
proper conclusion is that antidumping law should not apply to
NME's. If the inefficiencies of a nonmarket system cause the NME's
products' prices to be "too low" in a market economy country mar-
ket, such as the United States market, then the NME is, in effect,
subsidizing the market economy country. If, on the other hand, the
control capabilities of the NME allow it to take advantage of its abil-
ity to allocate resources and direct output so as to threaten some
portion of the market economy country, then the NME is engaging in
predatory pricing, not subsidizing the exported goods. Any system
of unfair trade practice law applicable to NME's should permit such
countries to grant boons to the United States, but should not allow
the NME to feed off of the vulnerabilities inherent in a market-based
economic system.
C. Market Disruption Law
Market disruption occurs whenever rapidly increasing imports
from a country dominated or controlled by Communism cause mate-
rial injury to a domestic industry.82 When each of these elements is
found by the appropriate federal agency, the President is empowered
to impose quotas or increased tariffs, order the award of trade ad-
justment assistance, or negotiate orderly marketing agreements.8 3
Any relief imposed relates only to the countries under investigation
before the federal agencies.8 4
The market disruption statute, codified as section 406 of the
Trade Act of 1974, was designed to provide an effective remedy
against injury that could be brought about by the rapid shift of
nonmarket resources from one industry to another, so as to injure a
82 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982) (codifying Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, § 406, 88
Stat. 2062 (1975)). The provision provides in part:
(a)(1) [T]he International Trade Commission . . . shall promptly make an
investigation to determine, with respect to imports of an article which is the
product of a Communist country, whether market disruption exists with re-
spect to an article produced by a domestic industry.
(e) For purposes of this section-
(1) The term "Communist country" means any country dominated or
controlled by communism.
(2) Market disruption exists within a domestic industry whenever im-
ports of an article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by
such domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively,







U.S. industry.8 5 This design clearly recognizes that different forces
are at work in a NME than are at work in a market economy. Fur-
thermore, it specifically addresses the predatory effect of rapid pric-
ing shifts, 86 which is the threat that a NME poses to market-based
systems.
Two elements of a market disruption investigation deserve spe-
cial attention. They are the range of countries covered by the statute
and the definition of rapid increase.87 In addition, the application of
the market disruption statute to overdependence of the United
States on foreign supplies of strategic materials should be
considered.88
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 specifically relates only to
imports from "Communist countries." Nevertheless, section 406
forms part of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, and throughout the
rest of this title, reference is made to NME countries. This could
raise a presumption that the two terms are meant to be synonymous,
or could signify that somewhat different coverage is sought within
section 406. The issue has been raised, but not resolved, in ITC de-
liberations. 89 Any new legal structure to deal with East-West trade
should resolve this ambiguity legislatively.
In order for market disruption to exist, imports must be under-'
going a rapid increase in either quantity or U.S. market share. It is
this act of rapid increase, rather than any unfair trade practice, that
forms the basis for a market disruption sanction. Implicit in this is
the recognition that rapid shifts in production within a NME are not
necessarily unfair. Indeed, it is unlikely that the term "fair" applies
at all to this aspect of East-West trade.90 Disruption, not unfairness,
85 See Unrefined Montan Wax from East Germany, USITC Pub. 1214, Inv. No. TA-
406-7, at 13 (1982).
86 See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (discussing economic disruption).
87 Analyses of material injury and causation are similar to those used under the an-
tidumping statute. For an analysis of material injury, see Anhydrous Ammonia from the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. 1006, Inv. No. TA-406-5 (1979). See also
Ceramic Kitchenware and Tableware from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub.
1279, Inv. No. TA-406-8 (1982); Canned Mushrooms from the People's Republic of China,
USITC Pub. 1293, Inv. No. TA-406-9 (1982). In determining causation, the standard of
"significant cause" is harder to satisfy than is the simple causation standard of the an-
tidumping laws and imposes certain new issues of alternate causation. However, the es-
sential thrust and techniques of analysis are sufficiently comparable to satisfy the interests
of this Article.
88 See infra note 121 and accompanying and following text (discussing national de-
fense concerns).
89 "[I]t is possible to conceive of a market economy run by a government formed by a
communist country; likewise, it is also possible to conceive of a basically non-market econ-
omy whose government is non-communist." Anhydrous Ammonia from the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. 1006, Inv. No. TA-406-5, at 20 (1979).
90 Indeed, Congress explicitly recognized that imports from Communist countries
could enter the United States without damaging any United States industry or national
interest, provided the quantity were reasonable in light of recent trade history. See S. REP.
No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 211 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
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becomes the key.
On occasion, the ITC has addressed the question of U.S.
overdependence upon Communist country sources for strategic
materials, within the context of determining material injury or threat
thereof.9 1 The Senate considered this issue of overdependence im-
portant when considering the Trade Act of 1974.92 Unfortunately,
neither the statute itself nor the House deliberations deal with this
overdependence issue at all, and ITC deliberations have been incon-
clusive. An important aspect of East-West trade is thus left in
limbo. 9 3
Historically, the NME market disruption statute has not proven
very effective in protecting domestic industries from NME imports.
Of eleven market disruption petitions brought before the ITC, seven
have resulted in findings of no disruption. 94 One has produced a
split decision, resulting in a recommendation to the President that
import relief be imposed. 95 Three have resulted in findings of mar-
ket disruption.9 6 None has resulted in any import relief, as the Presi-
dent has exercised his discretionary power to reject the ITC's
recommendation.
Such results have led some to argue that section 406 is totally
inadequate for protecting domestic industries from non-market pre-
dation. 9 7 It has led others to argue that the basic premise of section
NEWS 7186, 7342. This implies that the potential disruptive effect of nonmarket-based
shifts in trade patterns, rather than any particular level of East-West trade, concerned
Congress.
91 See Ferrosilicon from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. 1484,
Inv. No. TA-406-10, at 16 (1984); Anhydrous Ammonia from the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, USITC Pub. 1051, Inv. No. TA-406-6, at 1 (1980); Anhydrous Ammonia from
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. 1006, Inv. No. TA-406-5, at 29-30
(1979).
92 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 211 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 7186, 7342.
93 This concern of strategic overdependence has been left in limbo in the trade laws,
but is implicit in other aspects of governmental response to NME trade. The author sus-
pects that the irony of "NME" and "enemy" being homonyms has not gone unnoted.
94 See Ferrosilicon from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. 1484,
Inv. No. TA-406-10 (1984); Certain Ceramic Kitchenware and Tableware from the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1279, Inv. No. TA-406-8 (1982); Unrefined Montan
Wax from East Germany, USITC Pub. 1214, Inv. No. TA-406-7 (1982); Anhydrous Ammo-
nia from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. No. 1051, Inv. No. TA-406-
6 (1980); Clothespins from the Socialist Republic of Romania, USITC Pub. 902, Inv. No.
TA-406-4 (1978); Clothespins from the Polish People's Republic, USITC Pub. 902, Inv.
No. TA-406-3 (1978); Certain Gloves from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub.
867, Inv. No. TA-406-1 (1978).
95 See Canned Mushrooms from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 1293,
Inv. No. TA-406-9.
96 See Ammonium Paratungstate and Tungstic Acid from the People's Republic of
China, USITC Pub. 1982, Inv. No. TA-406-11 (1987); Anhydrous Ammonia from the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USITC Pub. 1006, Inv. No. TA-406-5 (1979); Clothes-
pins from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 902, Inv. No. TA-406-2 (1978).
97 Cuneo & Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: The State- Controlled Economy Issue in Antidump-
ing Law Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 277, 307 (1982); Potter, East- West Countertrade:
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406 is fine, but that too much discretion is given to the President to
reject ITC recommendations of import relief.98 Language was intro-
duced during consideration of the 1988 Act to limit Presidential dis-
cretion to overturn such recommendations, 99 but did not become
part of the final law. Despite these concerns, market disruption law
has been recommended as the only reasonable approach to regulat-
ing trade with NME countries. 100
In sum, the market disruption statute is the only statute
designed specifically with NME trade in mind.' 0 ' As such, it ap-
proaches East-West trade issues from the standpoint of preventing
one type of evil made possible by the existence of nonmarket deci-
sion makers-disruption of the orderly development of market
forces and allocations by reason of abrupt alterations of production
or price from a NME. The market disruption statute provides a very
useful tool in dealing with East-West trade. In that it deals with only
one aspect of East-West trade directly, and perhaps deals peripher-
ally with the issue of strategic overdependence on non-market
sources, the market disruption statute should be only one level of a
multitiered approach to nonmarket trade. 0 2
IV. Proposals For Change
A. The Failure of Market Conceptions
Neither "fair trade" nor "comparative advantage" is a meaning-
ful concept in East-West trade. Fair trade, if such a term is to make
Economic Injury and Dependence Under U.S. Trade Law, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 413, 425-33
(1981).
98 INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 196-97.
99 Section 135 of H.R. 3, as passed by the House of Representatives, limited execu-
tive branch discretion to reject an ITC recommendation under the market disruption stat-
ute to circumstances where the United States Trade Representative determines that the
proposed import relief would have "a serious negative impact" upon the economy of the
United States. During conference with the Senate, the House conceded this provision. H.
REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 692 (1988) (conference report of the 1988 Trade Act,
see supra note 2), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1725. Similarly,
§ 201 of the Senate amendment to H.R. 3 limited Presidential discretion to reject an ITC
recommendation under the escape clause statute to circumstances involving a threat to
national security, a serious injury to a consuming industry in the United States, a likeli-
hood of more jobs lost than created or preserved, or a burden on the poor or U.S. agricul-
ture. This provision also failed to become part of the bill finally enacted. See id. at 661-62,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1694-95.
100 INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 233-34 (statement of David P. Houlihan, Esq.). Simi-
lar remarks have been made about possible use or extension of the escape clause law set
forth in section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982)), a
market economy counterpart to the market disruption law. INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at
197 (statement of F. David Foster, Esq.), 216 (statement of Robert A. Cornell), 243 (state-
ment of Professor John J. Barcelo).
101 The 1988 Act amended antidumping law with respect to NME's, but did not alter
the market presumptions underlying the existing statutory scheme.
102 See infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text. This Article will not address issues
relating to the exportation of goods to NME's, COMECON, and United States export li-
censing programs.
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sense at all, requires an economic openness that permits free compe-
tition between the various actors in the marketplace.10 3 Such com-
petition can take place between producers or between nations.
For competition underlying free trade to take place on a pro-
ducer level, governmental interference must be too low to change
marketplace realities and to divert resources and alter the decisions
of the actors in the marketplace. It is possible to indulge in a fiction
that such absence of governmental interference exists in most of the
economies of the Western, market-oriented world.' 0 4 It is not possi-
ble to indulge in such a fiction in the overtly intrusive NME world.10 5
In NME's, government interference has reduced market forces
to relative insignificance in determining allocation of resources,
prices, and business and consumer decisions. 10 6 Let us consider the
heavily studied Soviet economy as an example. Studies have shown
that Soviet trade has been rational in the broad sense of exporting to
most countries those products as to which the Soviet Union has rela-
tively abundant factor endowments.' 0 7 In that broad sense, a limited
kind of comparative advantage may be at work in determining Soviet
foreign trade patterns. Nevertheless, a number of factors besides
comparative advantage have been found to be major determinants of
Soviet foreign trade patterns. Among these are "historical priority
of sector, . . the probability of plan fulfillment, the institution of
103 1 suggest that what we're really concerned about with respect to unfair com-
petition versus fair competition is that the former lacks durability. It is unfair
because the trade practice is based upon price discrimination, subvention of
exports, or nondurable resource allocation. It is not the kind of trade that an
importing country is willing to accept [due to] the social and economic costs
involved in making the resource reallocations required by the importing
country .... Imports displace domestic production. The resources have to
go someplace else; and if the trade is not going to be durable and continual,
even in this dynamic, changing world, there's no sense in undertaking the
adjustment that is involved.
INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 212 (statement of Mr. Meyer Rashish).
104 For a discussion of whether state-owned enterprises (SOE's) within market econo-
mies should be treated in the same manner as NME's, see INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at
201-08. Unlike market data with respect to NME's, reliable market data does exist with
respect to the economic framework within which SOE's operate. Such data permits rea-
sonable calculations of fair value for antidumping purposes. See id. at 204 (statement of
Professor Robert E. Hudec); id. at 208 (statement of Samuel A. Stern, Esq.). The existence
of such data has led one authority on trade to conclude that SOE's should be covered by
the countervailing duty law. See id. at 178 (statement of Peter Buck Feller, Esq.).
105 For a well-reasoned argument stating that essentially all governments interfere in
markets to such an extent that comparative advantage "normalcy" is indeterminable, see
generally Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV.
546 (1987). Such an argument is in accord with, but proceeds far beyond, the thrust of
this Article.
106 However, such interference may become less in the future if recent free market
developments in the Soviet Union, China, and some of Eastern Europe continue.
107 GARDNER, SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: THE DECISION PROCESS 141-42 (1983) (citing
McMillan, Factor Proportions and Structure of Soviet Foreign Trade, 15 ACES BULLETIN 57-81
(1973); McMillan, Some Recent Developments in Soviet Foreign Trade Theory, 12 CANADIAN SLA-
VONIC PAPERS 243-72 (1970)).
EAST-WEST TRADE
'Soviet agriculture,' and the trade pattern of bilateralized trading
partners." 08 The result of Soviet decision making based upon such
nonmarket factors is a substantial irrationality, in comparative advan-
tage terms, in Soviet trade. Indeed, one scholar studying 1959 So-
viet trade found that such trade, far from being rational, imposed a
net cost on the Soviet economy.10 9 Another scholar found the same
result in 1966 Soviet trade with East Germany." 0 Although the So-
viets have attempted to improve this situation,"1 ' substantial irra-
tionality in trade continues.' 12
That is not to say that market forces are insignificant in such
societies.s13 Clearly, market forces are a considerable factor in the
overall costs the society must bear to maintain a nonmarket system.
In theory, one may determine the degree of market distortion, and
hence the hidden costs of the system, by comparing the actual econ-
omy with a hypothetical free market system with the same endow-
ment factors. Nevertheless, in the real world of NME economic
systems, market forces are sufficiently undermined that private com-
petition provides no conceptual underpinnings for the concept of
fair trade.' 14
On the international level, the analysis is different. If each na-
tion is taken as an independent actor in a world marketplace, then
the internal inefficiencies within a country do no more to undermine
competition, and therefore free trade, than do inefficiencies of deci-
sion-making by an individual participant in the private marketplace.
It is inherent in the market system that individual participants make
108 M. DOHAN, Foreign Trade Specialization and Its Determinants in the Postwar Soviet Econ-
omy, 1950-1970, in II ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
126 (Z. Fallenbuchl ed. 1976).
109 McMillan, Factor Proportions and Structure of Soviet Foreign Trade, 15 ACES BULLETIN
57, 62-63, 67-68 (1973).
110 Gardner, The Embodied Factor Content of Soviet Foreign Trade: A Rejoinder, 23 ACES
BULLETIN 89 (1981); Gardner, The Factor Content of Soviet Foreign Trade: A Synthesis, 21 ACES
BULLETIN 1 (1979).
11 See generally Gardner, supra note 107, at 143-44.
112 Id. at 144-52.
13 Indeed, in some unusual circumstances, market style joint ventures have been es-
tablished within the economies of NME's:
An American joint venture in Romania, for example, might start to sell
its computer commercially in the United States allegedly at dumping prices.
Because that joint company in Romania keeps accounts in hard currency, be-
cause it has a profit motive, and because the wages are paid at world scale
and the land is leased at world scale, there is in effect a private market-econ-
omy company operating in a [NME]. Perhaps, then, [NME] dumping rules
should not be applicable in this unusual situation.
INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 224 (statement of Arthur Downey, Esq.). Similarly, the con-
clusions of this Article may be inapplicable to such unusual market style joint ventures.
114 Fairness is a meaningless concept in NME trade. INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 215
(statement of Robert A. Cornell); id. at 220 (statement of Bruce E. Clubb, Esq.), 226 (state-
ment of Meyer Rashish); id. at 233 (statement of David P. Houlihan, Esq.). If NME re-
sources are irrationally allocated, then the concept of comparative advantage is
meaningless in this context. Id. at 218 (statement of Dr. Martin J. Kohn).
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different decisions. The market generally rewards those who make
the best decisions, and all others either reform their decisions or are
winnowed out of the market. What matters in the international mar-
ketplace is no different; internal decisions are irrelevant and it is only
the actions of the participants that matter. A free market between
nations is therefore possible in theory despite massive governmental
interference within the markets of individual nations. 15
If each nation were to produce the goods in which it had a com-
parative production advantage, then the world would, as a whole, be
a better place. In this sense, comparative advantage is served by the
old-fashioned method of letting the international market move ineffi-
cient nation-producers aside. Thus, NME producers would have two
choices. They could find that their prices make no real economic
sense, within the meaning of comparative advantage, and would
amend their prices. In the alternative, they could continue to subsi-
dize market economy nations. NME producers can not do the latter
indefinitely, but while they do so, market economy nations have no
reason to complain, unless special circumstances exist that give rise
to a need for intervention in the workings of the free international
marketplace. What this approach will achieve is movement towards a
trading system based upon genuine comparative advantage.
It is extraordinarily difficult to anticipate just what the details of
an East-West trading system based upon true comparative advantage
would be. How is an economic observer looking down over the
world marketplace to determine whether one nation or another has a
comparative advantage without looking within each country to deter-
mine factor costs for each item produced? How can such factor costs
be determined without reference to elements of the internal market
of each producing country? 116 Because of the complete obscurity of
market-style information in NME's, such questions are unan-
swerable.
Because the structure of an East-West trading system based on
comparative advantage can not be anticipated, derogations from
such a system by NME's are unascertainable. In other words,
although it is possible to move towards a system of comparative ad-
vantage in East-West trade, it is impossible to manipulate or "cor-
rect" the market to bring about a system truly based on comparative
advantage. A fortiori, fine tuning on the level of antidumping and
115 Such a free market will not produce optimal allocations of production as compared
with a free market composed of totally informed and rational players, but will produce far
better results than will a restricted marketplace of relatively uninformed and irrational
players. In other words, optimal benefits of comparative advantage may not be achieved,
but they may not be available anyway in a world having massive governmental interference
with markets.
116 Wages, for example, are essentially incalculable in a NME. See INTERFACE I, supra
note 6, at 212 (statement of Meyer Rashish).
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countervailing duty determinations achieve nothing that is economi-
cally meaningful.
B. Economic Advantage
If comparative advantage is indeterminable in East-West trade,
then another premise must be found upon which to organize trade
relationships between the United States and NME's. Economic ad-
vantage provides such a premise. To the extent that a NME operates
efficiently, it merely provides competition comparable to that pro-
vided by market economy competitors. To the extent that it oper-
ates inefficiently, it provides some goods at too high a price and
others at too low a price to the world markets. Those priced too
high compared to available alternatives can be ignored. Those
priced too low can be obtained at a price which amounts to a net
wealth transfer between the NME and the economy of the United
States. Absent special circumstances, there is no reason not to ac-
cept such a transfer.1 17
Therefore, unless special circumstances dictate otherwise, it is in
the national economic interest to organize trade relations with
NME's so as to take maximum economic advantage of the inefficien-
cies of foreign government intervention. This will eventually have
the effect of driving the NME towards more rational, market-ori-
ented economic decision making. Until it does so, this approach to
East-West trade relations will have the effect of benefiting the citi-
zens of those countries which do follow relatively market-oriented
economic principles. The market forces themselves will, if permitted
to operate fully, create an economic drain upon the inefficient NME,
eventually moving it towards more rational allocation of its factors of
production and increasing the global trading system's approximation
to a system based upon comparative advantage. In the long term,
this will tend to benefit the nation whose economy is based upon
market principles.
C. Exceptions to Economic Advantage
Special circumstances could make this broad statement of lais-
sez-faire economic advantage inapplicable. Such circumstances can
arise in areas of economic disruption, industry predation, and
noneconomic concerns of national security.
117 "It's largely in.the public interest to have low prices on imports coming into the
United States. It doesn't really matter why the prices are low. On the other hand, there
might well be some public interest in looking carefully at cases where imports cause injury
to the domestic industry." INTERFACE I, supra note 6, at 243 (remarks of Professor JohnJ.
Barcelo, III).
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1. Economic disruption
Economic disruption could arise where shifts in market factors
occur without a basis in marketplace realities. One advantage of a
centrally controlled system is that it is capable of rapid shifts in pro-
duction and pricing of goods. 1 8 That such shifts produce addi-
tional, perhaps hidden, economic costs is either unrecognized or
accepted as a price of having a nonmarket system. As such changes
occur, market participants in other nations adjust to these shifts, but
they also suffer costs. Even though the benefits to the market-ori-
ented system, as a whole, of taking advantage of any increased ineffi-
ciencies in the NME will exceed such costs, the benefits may not be
distributed precisely to offset such costs. In the simplest example,
the benefits could fall to one sector of the economy (and, eventually,
be received by society as a whole), but the costs could be borne by
another sector totally. The more rapid such shifts, the greater the
economic costs of adjustment.
Where these costs of adjustment are relatively low, a strong
trade adjustment assistance program should be adequate to ensure
that one sector or segment of society does not bear a heavy burden
in providing national economic benefits.' 19 Where the costs of ad-
justment are relatively high, such an approach might prove inade-
quate. If that is so, then a valid reason exists to impose a tariff,
quota, or ban on the NME imports, in order to preserve domestic
economic stability.
2. Industry predation
Industry predation occurs when a NME targets an industry or
sector. Sustained pricing below prevailing market prices could drive
free market participants out of business in that industry or sector. If
all significant free market participants are driven from the market-
place, and if barriers to reentry or new entry are significant, then the
NME could obtain uneconomically high profits through monopoly or
oligopoly pricing. That would provide an appropriate basis for es-
tablishing higher tariffs on the NME product, refusing a short-term
economic gain in order to forestall a longer-term economic loss.
3. National Security
Threats to national security arise because market and nonmarket
economies compete on many levels. If a NME were to become a ma-
jor U.S. supplier in a militarily or geopolitically strategic sector, such
118 Trade Reform Act of1974: Report of the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, S.
REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1974).
119 The 1988 Act contains provisions designed to enhance the operation of the trade
adjustment assistance program. See 1988 Trade Act, supra note 3, §§ 1421-30 (to be codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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as raw materials, °20 technology, or know-how, then no degree of
economic benefit to the United States would be sufficient recom-
pense. Short-term profits would be more than overcome by longer-
term risks. Such a situation would warrant tariffs, quotas, or bans to
prevent dependence from developing.
If the special circumstances of economic disruption, industry
predation, or threat to national security arise, then the general prin-
ciple of taking economic advantage of the inefficiencies of NME trad-
ers must give way. Any system of regulating trade with nonmarket
economies must contain methods of handling these circumstances as
they arise. Absent such circumstances, economic advantage dictates
that trade with nonmarket economies be as unencumbered with bar-
riers as possible.
V. Conclusion
Current U.S. trade law regarding trade with NME countries is
replete with oddities and complexities that arise out of an attempt to
apply market-oriented economic principles to a nonmarket setting.
This attempt distorts the meaning of protective statutes designed to
assure "fair trade" between the United States and other free-market
traders in the world. In particular, when federal agencies and Con-
gress have acted to bring NME countries within the scope of the an-
tidumping laws, they have created a technical nightmare that fails to
achieve rational objectives in this area of trade. Only the market dis-
ruption statute, specifically designed with nonmarket economies in
mind, addresses trade with such countries in a sensible manner. 12
In contrast with concepts of "fair trade," concepts appropriate
to any analysis of trade between free-market economies, economic
relations with NME countries should be built around the concept of
''economic advantage." Economic advantage directs the United
States to import products from NME's at prices that appear commer-
cially low. By accepting such products, the United States will be ex-
ploiting the structural inadequacies of the NME and receiving a net
benefit from it. Either the United States will continue to have some
of its costs underwritten by the NME or the NME will be forced to
move towards market principles in its, economic relations and, pre-
sumably, in its internal economic workings.' 22 In order to facilitate
120 The only remaining valid justification for section 406 ... lies in its applica-
tion to vital raw materials cases. By favoring non-commufiist suppliers of raw
materials over communist suppliers, Congress achieves an important polit-
ical goal-the prevention of U.S. dependence on communist countries for
these materials at the expense of our traditional, more dependable suppliers.
Calabrese, Market Disruption Caused by Imports from Communist Countries: Analysis of Section 406
of the Trade Act of 1974, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 117, 132 (1981).
121 See supra text following note 88 (discussing the statutory use of "Communist coun-
try" in contrast to this article's use of "NME").
122 Many observers have noted that both China and the U.S.S.R. appear to be moving
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taking economic advantage of NME trade, strong adjustment assist-
ance programs must be available to workers who have been dispro-
portionately injured by such trade.
Certain special circumstances might make it inappropriate to ac-
cept low priced goods. If the low-priced goods come at a high cost
in market adjustment, anticompetitive effect, or national security,
they should not be welcomed. In particular, if the NME goods are
entering the U.S. economy in a commercially disruptive manner, or
so as to drive domestic participants out of a high-entry-barrier indus-
try, or so as to establish the NME as a prime source for strategic
materials, then preventive action must be taken. Accepting these ex-
ceptions to the principle of economic advantage would permit more
rational regulation of trade with NME's.' 23
in the direction of allowing free market concepts to determine the workings of their own
internal economies. In the case of the U.S.S.R., the term perestroika has come to be applied
to such restructuring. As such restructuring takes place, a threshold of economic reality
will be reached after which it will be possible to make normal market measurements. At
that point, comparative advantage will have regained meaning as a premise for trade rela-
tions and the proposals of this Article will no longer be applicable.
123 Certainly, much remains to be considered about, for example, the precise nature of
the triggering importations under the enumerated exceptions to economic advantage, the
application of economic advantage to those NME's already receiving MFN treatment from
the United States, and the remedial actions to be taken if one of the exceptional circum-
stances has been found. Nevertheless, the basic principles of this Article should provide
the foundation for consideration of those issues.
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